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ABSTRACT
Climate policy integration (CPI) is a key strategy for implementing 
climate policy action, spanning policy sectors and levels of govern-
ance. As a central agenda-setting actor in the EU, we argue that 
understanding the institutional capacity for CPI inside the European 
Commission is especially important for understanding the advance-
ment of CPI in the EU overall. We focus on the inner workings of the 
Commission, and we ask: what role does the leadership style of the 
Commission President play in advancing institutional capacity for 
implementing CPI? We assess the institutional capacity for CPI in 
the Commission during the Barroso and Juncker Presidencies, 
which display characteristics of bottom-up and top-down leader-
ship styles, respectively. While we do not find that one presidential 
leadership style is necessarily ‘better’ than the other at enhancing 
institutional capacities for CPI, we highlight important differences 
along four key factors, namely: (1) political commitment to over-
arching climate objectives and to the necessity of implementing 
CPI; (2) recognition of functional overlaps between policy objec-
tives and compatible beliefs for implementing CPI among policy-
makers; (3) an opportunity structure for innovative policy 
development and policy entrepreneurship; (4) and meaningful 
coordination and consultation mechanisms.
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1. Introduction
Complex societal challenges, such as climate change, require integrated policy responses. 
Given the boundary-spanning nature of both the causes of and solutions to climate 
change, the integration of climate policy objectives across policy systems is key (Jochim & 
May, 2010). Global commitments under the Paris Agreement to limit global warming to 
1.5–2°C can only be achieved if multiple policy areas, such as energy, transport, industry 
and agriculture, integrate climate objectives in a coherent manner. As outlined by 
Domorenok, Graziano, and Polverari (2021), advancing institutional capacity is neces-
sary for such policy integration.
The European Union (EU) aims to play a leading global role in combating climate 
change (Bäckstrand & Elgström, 2013; Oberthür & Roche Kelly, 2008; Wurzel, Liefferink, 
& Torney, 2019). The EU leadership's credibility lies in its ability to implement effective 
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climate policies internally. Climate policy integration (CPI) aims to address climate 
change across relevant policy areas that directly or indirectly contribute to the problem. 
Following Domorenok et al. (2021), we understand policy integration as aiming for 
coherence in policy goals, coordination in policy processes, and consistency across policy 
instruments. CPI includes process, output and outcome dimensions: institutional, deci-
sion-making rules leading to coherent policy outputs that lead to impactful outcomes, 
e.g. the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Adelle & Russel, 2013). The 
European Commission (hereafter: Commission) is especially important in advancing 
CPI in the EU, given its role as a key agenda-setter. The Commission drafts and proposes 
legislative measures (Egeberg, 2010).
We focus on the Commission’s internal institutional capacity to advance CPI, asking: 
what role does the leadership style of the Commission President play in advancing institu-
tional capacity for implementing CPI? We argue that the presidential leadership style may 
affect the Commission’s capacity to activate key drivers of CPI. Our research focuses on 
policy formulation and development inside the Commission, taking a closer look at 
internal vertical interactions. We focus predominantly on the policy process. While the 
literature on CPI and policy coordination more broadly has investigated horizontal 
interaction within the Commission (Hartlapp, Metz, & Rauh, 2013; Selianko & 
Lenschow, 2015), research on vertical aspects, including the presidential leadership 
style and resulting potential changes to institutional capacity, is limited (Kassim, 
Connolly, Dehousse, Rozenberg, & Bendjaballah, 2017).
We address the research question as follows. First, we carry out a literature review on 
CPI in the EU and the Commission. We derive four key driving factors for CPI, which 
form the core of our empirical focus: (1) political commitment to overarching climate 
objectives and to the necessity of implementing CPI; (2) recognition of functional over-
laps and compatible beliefs among policymakers; (3) an opportunity structure for 
innovative policy development and policy entrepreneurship; (4) and meaningful coordi-
nation and consultation mechanisms (Dupont, 2016; Jordan & Lenschow, 2008; Rietig, 
2019; Svensson, 2019). In addition, we review literature on the development of the office 
of the Commission President and on the characteristics of leadership styles. We under-
line the turn to ‘presidentialization’ (Kassim et al., 2017) or a strengthening of the office 
of the President, from 2004 when José Manuel Barroso entered office. We also note the 
characteristics of two ideal types of institutional leadership styles that refer to preferences 
in organizational structure: bottom-up and top-down.
Second, in our empirical analysis, we analyze the leadership of the Barroso (2004– 
2014) and Jean-Claude Juncker (2014–2019) Presidencies for evidence of the four driving 
factors for CPI. We highlight the bottom-up characteristics of Barroso’s Presidency and 
the top-down characteristics of Juncker’s Presidency. We emphasize that both espouse 
the ‘presidential’ leadership style, although neither leadership style follows an ideal type, 
but rather they exist along a continuum between the end points of fully bottom-up and 
top-down characteristics.
Third, we discuss our findings, which highlight changes in the Commission’s institu-
tional capacity to activate the drivers of CPI under the different presidential leadership 
styles. Under Barroso’s presidential leadership, which we suggest displays characteristics 
of bottom-up leadership, we find an opportunity structure for policy entrepreneurs from 
the Directorate-Generals (DG) and Cabinets to pursue their policy preferences. This 
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institutional context allowed for policy innovation on, and advancement of certain 
aspects of, CPI. Under Juncker’s Presidency, which we suggest displays characteristics 
of top-down leadership, there was a declared political commitment to climate policy and 
CPI. Yet, implementation of CPI was patchy in practice. This could be owing to the 
hierarchical organizational structure adopted by Juncker that increased the number of 
gatekeepers, meaning that policy entrepreneurs had higher barriers to overcome in 
advancing innovative proposals.
Our article thus contributes to literature on both CPI in the EU context and to 
literature on the role of leadership styles in advancing institutional capacity for policy 
integration. We also contribute to literature investigating Commission Presidencies. The 
findings point to an important role for the Commission’s leadership level in advancing 
institutional capacity for CPI, although further nuance in the results would require 
additional research and analysis. The article opens up future research avenues, including 
on the interaction among the four driving factors within an institutional setting, and new 
empirical work on Commission presidential leadership styles.
2. Climate policy integration and presidential leadership in the Commission
The Commission plays a unique role in the EU institutional system. It is a hybrid political 
and administrative institution, and one of its main roles is to propose new legislative 
measures for negotiation and adoption by the European Parliament and the Council of 
the EU (Egeberg, 2010). This makes understanding policy formulation and decision- 
making within the Commission important for understanding CPI in the EU overall. 
Indeed, scholars agree that (the Commission’s role in) the agenda-setting phase is an 
important determinant for EU policy outcomes (Hartlapp et al., 2013; Kassim et al., 
2017), but there are few connections between assessments of CPI in the EU and broader 
literature on the internal institutional capacity of the Commission.
By reviewing research on CPI in the EU and in the Commission, and on presidential 
leadership styles, we outline a framework for our analysis of the institutional capacities 
for CPI under the different presidential leadership styles of Barroso and Juncker.
2.1. Climate policy integration in the EU and in the Commission
CPI, at its most basic, means integrating climate policy objectives across other policy 
goals, processes and instruments. Analyses of CPI in the EU have shown that it has had 
different degrees of success, depending on whether the emphasis of analysis is on CPI as 
a policy outcome (effective improvements in combating climate change in practice), 
policy process (coordination towards integrated responses to climate change) or policy 
output (decisions in other policy domains that take climate change into account), and 
depending on the policy focus (e.g. energy, agriculture, others) (Alons, 2017; Candel & 
Biesbroek, 2018; Dupont, 2016; Rietig, 2019).
For CPI to occur in practice, scholars have identified several driving factors that play 
out at different levels – systemic, organizational and individual (Domorenok et al., 
2021) – and at different stages of the policy process. These driving factors include: (1) 
political commitment to overarching climate objectives and to the necessity of imple-
menting CPI; (2) recognition of functional overlaps between policy objectives and 
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compatible beliefs for implementing CPI among policymakers; (3) an opportunity 
structure for innovative policy development and policy entrepreneurship; (4) and mean-
ingful coordination and consultation mechanisms (Dupont, 2016; Jordan & Lenschow, 
2008; Rietig, 2019; Svensson, 2019). Table 1 provides an overview. Following Domorenok 
et al. (2021), we differentiate between formal and informal measures for the respective 
driving factors occurring across levels of capacity.
The Commission’s record on enhancing institutional capacity along these four 
main factors for implementing CPI is patchy. Previous research has revealed the 
relative persistence of siloed policymaking, sometimes despite other favorable 
conditions, such as political commitment and a legal framework for policy inte-
gration under Article 11 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (Dupont, 
2016; Dupont & Jordan, 2021; Selianko & Lenschow, 2015). But there is also 
evidence of changes in institutional capacity towards CPI, particularly in terms 
of coordination and consultation (Hartlapp et al., 2013; Jordan & Lenschow, 2010; 
Selianko & Lenschow, 2015). Examples include the development of impact assess-
ment procedures, public consultation and obligatory cross-DG coordination pro-
cesses (Kassim et al., 2017; Runhaar, 2016). The Commission has also produced 
policy outputs that have emphasized CPI, including the 2008 and 2016 proposals 
for integrated climate and energy packages (see Table 2). Nevertheless, research on 
the vertical coordination processes and the role of presidential leadership styles for 
advancing institutional capacities to drive CPI forward remains limited (Kassim 
et al., 2017).
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2.2. The changing role of the Commission President
Given the Commission’s hybrid role, its President is therefore both a political leader, in 
particular towards other EU institutions and international partners, and an adminis-
trative leader, steering the internal functioning of the Commission (Kassim et al., 2017; 
Nugent & Rhinard, 2015). The multi-functional role of the President has meant that 
different individuals holding the post have shaped the role in different ways, but over 
time the President has taken on more power and responsibility. Explanations for the 
change lie in both the institutional set-up and the personal traits of the President. On the 
one hand, literature highlights the interaction of changes in internal and external 
resources and constraints to explain the range of Commission president leadership styles, 
including Treaty reform and administrative capacities in support of the Presidency 
(Kassim et al., 2017). On the other hand, personal attributes and priorities of the leader 
can determine the leadership style adopted (ibid.; Nugent & Rhinard, 2015).
Over time, the internal/external resources, constraints and personal attributes and 
ambitions have led to what scholars identified as a trend towards ‘presidentialization’ 
(Kassim, 2017; Nugent & Rhinard, 2015), whereby the role of the President is increas-
ingly powerful and more distinguishable from the roles of other Commissioners. 
Presidentialization refers to several developments that include changes to the external 
(through an increasing public role) and internal (through tighter authority over the 
College of Commissioners, for example) roles of the President (Nugent & Rhinard, 2015).
Table 2. Integrated climate and energy packages to 2020 and to 2030; own compilation.
CPI policy proposal Objectives Legislative measures
Climate and energy package to 
2020 
Proposed January 2008, 
agreed December 2008 
Barroso I Presidency
Reduce GHG emissions by 20% 2020 
compared to 1990 levels; 
Increase RE share in final energy 
consumption to 20% by 2020; 
Improve EE by 20% by 2020, 
compared to business-as-usual 
projections by 2020.
Emissions Trading Directive (revision) 
(2009/29/EC) 
Effort Sharing Decision (406/2009/EC) 
Renewable Energy Directive (2009/28/ 
EC) 
Carbon Capture and Storage Directive 
(2009/31/EC)
Climate and energy framework to 
2030:‘‘Clean Energy for all 
European’’ 
Proposed November 2016, 
fully adopted by 2019 
Juncker Presidency
Reduce GHG emissions by at least 40% 
by 2030; 
Increase share of RE in energy 
consumption to at least 32% by 
2030; 
Improve EE by at least 32.5% by 
2030.
Regulation on the Governance of the 
Energy Union and Climate Action 
(2018/1999) 
Emissions Trading Directive (revision) 
(2018/410) 
Effort sharing Regulation (2018/842) 
Regulation on Land Use, Land-Use 
Change and Forestry (2018/841) 
Renewable Energy Directive (recast) 
(2018/2001) 
Energy Efficiency Directive (revision) 
(2018/2002) 
Energy Performance of Buildings 
Directive (revision) (2018/844) 
Electricity Market Regulation (recast) 
(2019/943) 
Electricity Market Directive (recast) 
(2019/944) 
Regulation on Risk Preparedness (2019/ 
941) 
Regulation on the Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
(recast) (2019/942)
GHG = greenhouse gas; RE = renewable energy; EE = energy efficiency.
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From the perspective of institutional capacity for CPI, the Commission as an institu-
tion operates at the systemic level within the EU system, with the President playing 
a driving role at the internal organizational and individual level in choosing whether or 
not to steer the Commission towards cross-sectoral policy strategies (Domorenok et al., 
2021). The President holds responsibility for managing the institution’s organizational 
structure and its capacity for coordination. And the President can enhance institutional 
capacity as an individual leader with knowledge and competencies for CPI and by 
promoting such skills in employees. The style of presidential leadership, therefore, may 
affect the Commission’s institutional capacity to activate the drivers of CPI (see Table 1).
2.3. Presidential leadership styles for CPI inside the Commission
In broader administrative understandings of leadership, we can differentiate between 
a ‘top-down’ hierarchical leadership style and a ‘bottom-up’ inclusive leadership style 
that grants a high level of autonomy to staff (Locke, 2003). Top-down and bottom-up 
leadership styles imply certain choices or preferences in organizational set-up (e.g. 
hierarchical or flat organization). At the same time, we recognize that the President’s 
leadership style is shaped by the institutional structure of the position of the President 
(positional leadership) and the individual President’s agency to lead (behavioral leader-
ship) (Müller, 2020). Therefore, the top-down and the bottom-up leadership styles 
should be seen as two end points along a scale, whereby in empirical practice leadership 
styles exist at a point along this continuum.
A top-down leadership style relies on a hierarchical organizational structure. It is based 
on a unitary and centralized command structure where agenda-setting and decision- 
making power are concentrated at the highest level. Lower levels follow the direction set 
by the top executive, who creates the vision, promotes change and motivates employees 
(Locke, 2003). Such a leadership style may not stimulate innovative policy development and 
policy entrepreneurship at lower levels as the focus is on following orders and implement-
ing detailed guidance from the President’s office. However, it may promote a higher degree 
of responsibility and commitment towards CPI, depending on the priorities of the 
President. We would expect to find an organizational structure that ensures checks on 
the alignment of activities at lower levels with the overarching vision of the President.
A bottom-up leadership style focuses on granting autonomy to individual employees. 
We would expect such a leadership style to facilitate a supportive organizational archi-
tecture that allows opportunities for innovative policy development and policy entrepre-
neurship, with skilled and motivated policy entrepreneurs taking advantage of windows 
of opportunity to build coalitions of like-minded individuals to advance a policy idea 
(Braun, 2009; Mintrom, 2013). Central challenges include barriers to overcoming differ-
ent or conflicting underlying interests or beliefs between Directorate Generals or 
Commissioner’s Cabinets and a potential lack of commitment at the highest level 
(Rietig, 2019). A lack of commitment at the highest level could result in innovative policy 
proposals failing to attract sufficient political support or conflicting with other initiatives 
originating elsewhere in the Commission.
Analytically, we draw inspiration from these ideal types of leadership styles to under-
stand the role of the leadership style of the Commission President in advancing CPI along 
the four driving factors outlined in Table 1.
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3. Methodology
In our empirical analysis, we seek evidence for each of the driving forces in the 
Commission during different Presidency tenures to establish whether different leader-
ship styles affect the institutional capacity for CPI. Evidence for each factor builds on the 
outline of empirical measures for institutional capacity for policy integration presented in 
Table 1 and adapted from Domorenok et al. (2021) including the existence of: over-
arching policy programs, inter-departmental coordination, cross-sectoral policy plans, 
and commitment to developing intersectoral linkages.
We drew data from multiple sources, including literature, official documents, speeches 
and semi-structured interviews. We analyzed over 50 policy documents (green/white 
papers, communications from the Commission, Council and European Council conclu-
sions, European Parliament documents, and the legislative documents listed in Table 2) 
and over 20 speeches from Commission Presidents, Commissioners and other relevant 
actors. We further analyzed 63 semi-structured elite interviews carried out by the authors 
between 2011 and 2020. The interviewees were representatives of the Commission [EC] 
(Cabinets and DGs for Agriculture, Climate Action, Energy, Environment, Civil 
Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, and the Joint Research Centre), member 
states [MS] (including Austria, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK), environmental NGOs, and staff and Members of 
the European Parliament [EP]. The interview questions focused on leadership styles, 
experiences of capacity for CPI, and leadership influence on CPI in the policymaking 
process inside the Commission towards key Directives and strategies (see Table 2). Given 
our interest in assessing different leadership styles since the turn to ‘presidentialization’, 
and given the limited availability of elite interviewees from the Santer and Prodi 
Commissions of the late 1990s and early 2000s, our analysis focuses on the Barroso 
and Juncker Commissions.
4. Leadership styles and CPI: From the Barroso to the Juncker Commissions
In assessing whether Commission President leadership styles affect institutional capacity 
for CPI in the Commission, we focus on the Barroso and Juncker Presidencies. While 
their leadership styles are not ideal-types, we identify the Barroso Commission as one 
that displays certain characteristics of a bottom-up leadership style, particularly with 
regard to organizational set-up, while the Juncker Commission displays characteristics 
of a top-down leadership style. These Presidencies are both characterized by the turn to 
‘presidentialization’ (see above; Kassim et al., 2017). For each President, we outline, first, 
the characteristics of their leadership style. Next, we analyze data from literature, docu-
ments and interviews to establish whether there is evidence of the four driving factors for 
CPI (see Table 1).
4.1. Bottom-up leadership style in the 2004–2014 Barroso Commission
The Barroso Commission was, like the Commissions under previous leadership, char-
acterized by an openness to bottom-up leadership across levels. Kassim et al. (2017) 
pinpoint 2004 as the start of the turn to presidentialization, when Barroso took office. 
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They characterize Barroso as engaging in ‘presidential policy leadership’, although his 
style evolved over the course of his two terms. Characteristics of this leadership style 
include a conception of the Presidency as requiring a strong personal leadership role and 
responsibility or co-responsibility for major project development, supported by a flat 
hierarchy of the College of Commissioners. Under presidential policy leadership, the 
President takes the lead in setting policy priorities inside the Commission. Barroso also 
laid a high emphasis on ‘better regulation’, meaning that fewer legislative measures were 
pursued during his tenure, and some proposals were even withdrawn (Kassim & 
Bocquillon, 2019; Kassim et al., 2017). Barroso implemented organizational reforms 
that strengthened his office (e.g. by turning the Commission’s Secretariat General into 
a personal service of the President), but he kept a flat hierarchical structure while also 
trying to implement oversight (through coordination mechanisms and impact assess-
ment) to ensure policy development inside the Commission aligned with policy prio-
rities. Barroso’s leadership can be characterized as closer to a bottom-up leadership style 
than top-down, but with some oversight institutionalized through certain reforms. We 
find that this leadership style adopted by Barroso left room for bottom-up leadership to 
be exercised across a number of CPI policymaking processes by policy entrepreneurs, 
pointing to the central relevance of an opportunistic structure for innovative policy 
development. The opportunity structure under Barroso’s Presidency emerged once 
a political commitment to the overarching objectives was signaled, providing leeway to 
policy entrepreneurs at different levels of hierarchy to implement CPI.
4.1.1. Evidence of institutional capacity for CPI
The biofuels controversy within the development of the 2008 Renewable Energy 
Directive (RED) (Rietig, 2018; see Table 2) illustrates the importance of compatible 
beliefs, the scope for disagreements between DGs/Cabinets and the limits of coordination 
and consultation mechanisms. The integration of climate objectives into energy and 
transport policy put the Renewable Energy Unit in DG Energy in charge of drafting the 
RED legal text with the components of electricity, biofuels and heating/cooling. The 
policy officer in charge of the biofuels targets developed a high level of expertise in the 
preparatory phase (EC 1; Sharman & Holmes, 2010). This allowed the policy officer to 
emerge as a central policy entrepreneur in the internal negotiations within the 
Commission, especially with DG Environment, and in particular in swaying the 
Council to request the Commission to develop a proposal for a directive with a 10% 
biofuels target (EC 2; EC 3).
As new scientific evidence emerged on the questionable climate benefits of food-crop 
based first-generation biofuels after the political objectives on biofuels had been decided, 
a controversy around the 10% biofuels/renewable energies in transport target ensued 
within and beyond the Commission (Sharman & Holmes, 2010). The environment- 
focused coalition led by DG Environment emphasized the need to revise the 10% target 
based on the new scientific evidence and the underlying belief that environmental 
implications should be prioritized over the remaining economic and energy security 
benefits of first-generation biofuels. Economic and energy security priorities were high-
lighted by, and aligned with, the underlying beliefs and policy priorities of the economic 
development-focused coalition led by DG Energy (Rietig, 2019). The new scientific 
evidence resulted in changed policy beliefs among the environment-focused coalition, 
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which had previously supported all types of renewable energy because these were all seen 
as benefitting climate action (EC 6). As a consequence, the previously aligned policy 
beliefs of both coalitions diverged, which resulted in immediate policy conflict and the 
adoption of a de-facto 10% target for first-generation biofuels as well as a difficult and 
incremental reform process to limit the share of first-generation biofuels in the 2010s 
(Rietig, 2019).
It was possible for individuals within the Renewable Energy Unit to act as policy 
entrepreneurs with regards to the details of the RED, thus displaying a very high level of 
political acumen and influence in the policymaking process, because they were acting 
within the political commitment to overarching climate objectives. Commission 
President Barroso was overall supportive of renewable energy policies and understood 
the importance of showcasing European leadership by adopting the 2008/09 European 
Climate and Energy Package ahead of the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change negotia-
tions (EC 4; EC 6; EC 7; see Table 2). A drawback of the bottom-up leadership style was, 
however, that once policy beliefs among different DGs compete, conflict emerges within 
the Commission with limited mediation through the Presidency. This was the case when 
the new scientific evidence on the problematic climate impacts of food-crop-based 
biofuels resulted in a beliefs-based debate around prioritizing climate action by limiting 
food-crop-based biofuels favored by DG Environment/Climate Action or prioritizing 
economic development through supporting the expansion of food-crop-based biofuels 
favored by DG Energy. This conflict resulted in policy lock-in that required a long and 
incremental reform process (Rietig, 2019).
Within Barroso’s bottom-up leadership style, policy entrepreneurs were key to achiev-
ing CPI and avoiding backsliding. The 2008 mini-reform of the EU Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP), termed ‘Health Check’, demonstrates the consequences if 
strong policy entrepreneurship is absent. It made a step backwards compared to the 
achievements of the previous greening reform, championed by the Commissioner for 
Agriculture and Rural Development Franz Fischler (Pirzio-Biroli, 2008), by abolishing 
the requirement for farmers to set 10% of their arable land aside as ecological areas. Issues 
were re-framed, catering to the agricultural industry’s traditional interests of maintaining 
subsidies and limiting greening to voluntary measures (EC 8; EC 9; EC 10; MS 1; MS 2). 
However, without a committed Commissioner and explicit Presidential political com-
mitment to help sustain momentum during the political decision-making in the College 
of Commissioners and Council, the political opposition exploited the opportunity to roll 
back some of the previous greening achievements. ‘The Commissioner had a business-as- 
usual agenda, (. . .) just trying to preserve the system (. . .), her agenda was “don’t rock the 
boat, keep the subsidies flowing, do some cosmetics on the side”’ (Environmental 
NGO 1). This ‘step backwards’ illustrates the importance of committed policy entrepre-
neurs at the Commissioner level to translate a policy proposal into a policy outcome. The 
subsequent 2012/13 ‘Ciolos’ CAP reform achieved some modest progress on greening 
due to policymakers’ perception of, and actual changes in, public demand for climate 
action, and the strong belief among the Commissioner and Head of Cabinet for 
Agriculture and Rural development that the CAP needs to adapt to maintain its relevance 
and funding levels (EC 11).
In parallel to the 2012/13 CAP reform, Cabinet/DG Climate Action introduced the 
proposal to dedicate 20% of the EU 2014–2020 budget to mainstreaming (CPI measures). 
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They formed a group of policy entrepreneurs consisting of the Commissioner for Climate 
Action, three key members of her cabinet and six police officers/heads of unit at DG 
Climate Action. In particular, one policy officer worked steadily on climate mainstream-
ing over several years. Once the opportunity of using the EU budget as a vehicle for 
stronger climate mainstreaming was spotted, this policy officer convinced key actors in 
the DGs’ and Cabinets’ hierarchy to exploit this opportunity and frame climate change as 
a policy problem that can be addressed by dedicating 20% of the EU’s budget to activities 
co-beneficial for climate action (EC 12; EC 13; EC 14; EC 16; EC 17). The Commissioner 
for Climate Action used her political acumen and position in the College to get climate 
mainstreaming adopted as a Commission proposal. This group commanded expertise- 
based credibility allowing them to minimize opposition to their proposal, although they 
did not play a leading role in the negotiations with the Parliament and Council them-
selves (EC15; EC 16, EC 18, EC 19; MS 5). In the case of the EU budget, this proved 
sufficient as the climate mainstreaming proposal was widely ignored in the Council 
discussions, given pressing economic concerns. Overall, the integration of the 20% 
mainstreaming objective into the EU budget was possible because of the dedication 
and action of policy entrepreneurs who acted within Barroso’s overall support and 
political commitment for climate action by exploiting the existing window of opportu-
nity of a new EU budget. The policy entrepreneurs involved in the CAP reform and 
climate mainstreaming in the EU budget both framed their proposals with a ‘public 
money for public goods’ narrative and created the public appearance of coordinated 
efforts within the Commission, although there was no strong exchange about the 
legislative proposals (EC 13; EC 15; EC 20).
4.2. Top-down leadership style in the 2014–2019 Juncker Commission
President Jean-Claude Juncker shifted to what can be largely categorized as a top-down 
leadership style, with a clear centralization of political leadership within the Commission 
(Kassim, 2017). When Juncker campaigned under the Spitzenkandidat procedure (in 
which the Commission President appointment was linked to the European Parliament 
elections, based on Article 17.7 of the Treaty on European Union), he espoused a vision 
of a ‘political Commission’ (Dawson, 2019; Kassim & Laffan, 2019). This was to set his 
Presidency apart from previous Commissions, whose Presidents had tended to downplay 
its political aspects (Kassim & Laffan, 2019; Tömmel, 2020). Kassim and Bocquillon 
(2019) referred to Juncker as espousing a ‘programmatic presidential style’, with strong 
political leadership, and with the President defining priorities.
Juncker implemented internal organizational reform to enact his vision of a political 
Commission (Bürgin, 2018a, 2020b; Kassim, 2017; Kassim et al., 2017). He highlighted 
ten priorities that were to guide all Commission activity. Juncker defined and developed 
the priorities for his Presidential term. He created a multi-layered, hierarchical organiza-
tional structure to oversee implementation of these priorities. He appointed five Vice- 
Presidents, who managed the priority teams, composed of several commissioners, and 
ensured that new initiatives were aligned with the priorities. Only initiatives that were 
assessed and recommended by one of the Vice-Presidents or by the First Vice-President 
(Frans Timmermans) would be considered. One of the ten priority areas called for ‘a 
resilient Energy Union with a forward-looking climate change policy’ (see Table 3).
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4.2.1. Evidence of institutional capacity for CPI
First, during Juncker’s Presidency, the priority-setting already showed some degree of 
presidential political commitment to CPI, and an understanding of functional overlaps 
between climate change and a range of other policy areas (Domorenok et al., 2021; 
Dupont, 2016; see Tables 1 & 3). Political commitment was declared by assigning the 
climate issue to one of the ten priorities, but sustaining this commitment was challenging. 
Over the course of Juncker’s Presidency, the EU faced several crises or turbulent situa-
tions (post-2008/2009 economic and euro crisis, migration crisis, and Brexit referen-
dum), diverting political attention away from climate action (Dupont, Oberthür, & 
Biedenkopf, 2018; Skovgaard, 2014). An examination of the annual State of the 
European Union speeches delivered by Juncker to the Parliament shows limited but 
regular interest in advancing climate action, although he provided limited declaratory 
evidence in these speeches of an understanding of the integrated nature (or functional 
policy overlaps) of the challenge. From 2015 to 2017, Juncker’s mentions of climate 
change focused on the EU’s aim for global leadership in international climate govern-
ance. In his 2018 speech, he added words on the feasibility of the EU’s internal climate 
and energy targets for 2030 (see Table 2), although still framed in the context of the EU 
taking responsibility globally and providing global climate leadership (Juncker, 2015, 
2016, 2017, 2018).
Second, in implementing the declared political commitment, questions were raised 
about Juncker’s choice of Commissioner to oversee the climate and energy portfolios, 
particularly regarding the candidate’s knowledge of the functional overlaps of his port-
folios, his competencies, and his interests in the climate aspect of his role (see Table 3). 
Commissioner Cañete faced tough questioning in Parliament about his energy focus, 
commitment to tackling climate change and connections to the oil industry (Euractiv, 
2014). His nomination was seen by some MEPs as an indication that the energy aspect 
took precedence. The Energy Union (European Commission, 2015) was a central part of 
the priority that included improving energy efficiency and renewable energy among five 
key objectives, but concrete climate or climate-integrated policy proposals took time to 
materialize (see Table 2).
Third, when it came to demonstrating political commitment by making integrated 
policy proposals, Juncker’s record varied over the course of his tenure. Dealing with the 
Table 3. Priority team connected to the goal of a ‘resilient energy union with a forward-looking 
climate change policy’, Juncker Presidency 2014–2019.
Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič
Directly connected policy portfolios Indirectly connected policy portfolios
Commissioner Portfolio Commissioner Portfolio
Miguel Arias 
Cañete
Climate action & energy Věra Jourová Justice, consumers & gender equality
Karmenu Vella Environment, maritime affairs & fisheries Pierre 
Moscovici
Economic & financial affairs, taxation 
& customs
Violeta Bulc Transport Marianne 
Thyssen
Employment, social affairs, skills & 
labour mobility










Carlos Moedas Research, science & innovation Mariya Gabriel Digital economy & society
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recovery from the euro crisis and the height of the migration crisis in 2015 left limited 
attention for climate change, especially in his first 2 years. Juncker also pursued a ‘Better 
Regulation’ agenda that aimed at identifying unnecessary or redundant EU policies. This 
agenda threatened certain established environmental policies, which revealed a lack of 
commitment or clear understanding of functional overlaps in practice, and which also 
partly explains the slow development of climate policy proposals in Juncker’s early years 
(Burns & Tobin, 2020; Gravey & Jordan, 2019).
With the climate negotiations in Paris in December 2015, momentum for climate 
action started to build in the EU, but the Commission was not in the driving seat. In 
preparation for the Paris conference, the European Council adopted a target to reduce 
GHG emissions by 40% by 2030 (European Council, 2014), asking the Commission to 
begin preparations for policy proposals. The Commission, however, published its 
proposals for a climate and energy framework towards 2030 only after the Paris 
Agreement had been adopted (see Table 2). Even then, the policy proposals were 
seen as incremental steps forward that were hardly in line with the Paris Agreement, 
which set a global framework for action to limit global temperature increase to 1.5–2°C 
(Kulovesi & Oberthür, 2020). Furthermore, the objectives on renewable energy and 
energy efficiency were increased from the European Council’s pre-Paris suggestions of 
27% (European Council, 2014) to 32% and 32.5% during the negotiations between the 
Parliament and the Council. The Commission first followed the European Council 
position rather than pushed for more ambitious climate action through its agenda- 
setting power.
From about 2018, also coinciding with the rise of protests, such as Fridays for Future, 
there is more evidence of political commitment to climate action and CPI and also of 
compatible underlying policymaker beliefs (on the importance of CPI) and recognition 
of overlaps. The Commission launched a communication in 2018 that set out a long-term 
climate strategy, with the central goal of climate neutrality by 2050 (European 
Commission, 2018). This communication referred explicitly to the Paris Agreement 
goals, and to the latest scientific knowledge, to call for increased EU climate ambition 
and to approach the issue in a more systematic and integrated manner. While the 
communication proposed no changes to the 2030 framework and attached no concrete 
policy proposals, it helped set the discussion on the 2050 climate neutrality goal in 
motion (EC 21).
The organizational restructuring implemented at the beginning of Juncker’s 
Presidency provides some evidence for the third and fourth driving factors (see Table 
1). The restructuring created a focus on ten overarching priorities, including climate 
action, and required coordination across a range of policy portfolios. Coordination 
mechanisms were put in place or further developed, bringing together Commission 
officials at early stages of policy development (EC 22). In practice, these were at first 
insufficient for advancing CPI (EC 22; EP 1; EP 2), and the quality of the exchanges inside 
these coordination mechanisms remained questionable (EC 21; EP 2). But these mechan-
isms nevertheless helped develop new habits of internal consultation (EC 21; 22). By the 
end of Juncker’s Presidency, these new habits were well-enough established that officials 
in the new von der Leyen Commission found themselves equipped to elaborate the 
overarching European Green Deal framework (Bloomfield & Steward, 2020; EC 22; 
European Commission, 2019).
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But the hierarchical and centralized structures provided few incentives for innovative 
policy development by policy entrepreneurs at lower levels (Bürgin, 2018b; EC 21). Policy 
entrepreneurs had to overcome high barriers before their proposal could be considered. 
There were three main types of overlapping barriers. First, there were content-based 
barriers. Policy entrepreneurs were obliged to align their proposals with at least one of 
the priorities. Their agenda-setting ability was thus hampered, as unaligned proposals did 
not pass the many gatekeepers (heads of unit, Commissioners, Vice-Presidents, and First 
Vice-President Timmermans) (EC 21). Second, the threshold for network-building was 
raised. Entrepreneurs are often skilled at building coalitions or connecting to networks 
(Braun, 2009). However, in this organizational setting, entrepreneurs had to build 
a network internally across a very wide range of DGs, and across several hierarchical 
levels. They had to convince a higher number of actors, including the ‘right’ actors, or 
gatekeepers. Third, and as a consequence, entrepreneurs needed to demonstrate espe-
cially high degrees of political skill. Politically savvy policy entrepreneurs were therefore 
more likely to advance their proposals, while other creative or innovative integrating 
proposals that lacked a politically well-connected proponent, were more quickly set aside 
(EC 21).
5. Discussion
We set out to investigate whether or how different presidential leadership styles in the 
Commission advance internal institutional capacities for CPI. In particular, we focused 
on the leadership styles of Barroso, from 2004 to 2014, and of Juncker, from 2014 to 2019. 
Both Presidents have been characterized as providing a presidential leadership style, but 
they each have their own characteristics. Barroso retained a fairly flat hierarchical 
structure, albeit with strengthened services for the President through the Secretariat- 
General, while he also aimed for some Presidential oversight of policy development 
inside the Commission. Juncker implemented organizational reform that created new 
hierarchical layers that were intended to deliver on his promise of a political 
Commission. Policy development pursued 10 key priorities developed and overseen by 
the President’s office. This reform added new gatekeepers for internal policy develop-
ment. As such, Barroso’s Presidency is characterized as more in line with a bottom-up 
leadership style while Juncker’s Presidency can be characterized as more in line with 
a top-down leadership style.
We find that the institutional capacity for CPI changed under the different leadership 
styles. We found variation in the institutional capacities for CPI as analyzed from the 
perspective of the four driving factors derived from literature and applied in our analysis: 
(1) political commitment to overarching climate objectives and to the necessity of 
implementing CPI; (2) recognition of functional overlaps and compatible beliefs 
among policymakers; (3) an opportunity structure for innovative policy development 
and policy entrepreneurship; (4) and meaningful coordination and consultation 
mechanisms.
Barroso offered overarching political commitment to climate objectives and to the 
necessity of implementing CPI to then allow policy entrepreneurs from the DGs and 
Cabinets to lead on implementation. Barroso was generally supportive of the overall 
policy-making direction within the wider strategic priorities of exercising EU leadership 
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in global climate change negotiations, especially leading up to the 2009 UN Climate 
Change summit in Copenhagen. Interviewees pointed towards general support, i.e. no 
objections, from Barroso with regards to the 2008 Renewable Energy Directive, greening 
the CAP and mainstreaming in the EU budget. Within these conducive framework 
conditions, policy entrepreneurs who possessed expert knowledge and the necessary 
political acumen had far-reaching autonomy in developing policy proposals, getting 
these adopted as the Commission’s position and negotiating on behalf of the 
Commission with other EU institutions. This also meant that for CPI to progress, the 
presence of dedicated, expert policy entrepreneurs was crucial, as the example of the 2008 
CAP Health Check highlights. The effectiveness of this institutional capacity for CPI is, 
however, limited as policy entrepreneurs had to ‘fight every step along the way’ to 
develop their ideas into adopted policy proposals. They encountered challenges with 
regards to other departments’ opposition to integrating climate policy into ‘their’ policy 
areas (Koch & Lindenthal, 2011), conflicting beliefs and policy priorities, as evident, for 
example, in the biofuels controversy (Sharman & Holmes, 2010), and with regards to 
‘flying under the radar’ of political and public attention, as in the case of the 2014–2020 
EU budget.
Under Juncker’s more top-down leadership style we see some political commitment; 
some recognition of functional overlaps; some developments in terms of coordination and 
consultation; and an organizational structure that hindered policy entrepreneurship from 
lower levels. There were variations over Juncker’s term, with more evidence of political 
commitment and recognition of functional overlaps, together with compatible beliefs on 
action for climate, in the second half of his Presidency (from around 2018).
We highlight three main findings with regards to institutional capacity for CPI under 
Juncker. First, political commitment to climate action is present at least in a declaratory 
sense, but this is only variably translated into commitment for, or an awareness of, the 
necessity of CPI. Climate policy was elevated to the highest political level. It was pursued 
through a priority focus that further integrated the energy and climate portfolios under 
one Commissioner and connected directly with the portfolios of five other 
Commissioners (see Table 3). However, this finding needs to be nuanced by the change 
in broader commitment to climate action in the EU as Juncker’s Presidency entered its 
final 2 years, which provided an opportunity for the Commission to advance on climate 
action. Second, Juncker’s priority-setting exercise and organizational reform required 
coordination and consultation across DGs, aligned policy proposals with main priorities 
(which included climate action), but stifled opportunities for innovative policy proposals 
from individual policy entrepreneurs. This was owing to the many gatekeepers and 
higher thresholds for networking for policy entrepreneurs to thrive. Third, these new 
habits of coordination, combined with heightened political commitment and new recog-
nition of overlaps, set the stage for enhanced institutional capacity in the Commission 
overall. This helped later in the development of the European Green Deal, an integrated 
overarching policy framework approach pursued by Juncker’s successor, President 
Ursula von der Leyen (Bloomfield & Steward, 2020; Dupont, Oberthür, & von 
Homeyer, 2020; European Commission, 2019).
Taking both the Barroso and Juncker Presidencies together, we see that the 
presidential leadership style plays a role in advancing institutional capacity for CPI, 
but that the interaction among the factors remains unclear from our analysis. At 
32 K. RIETIG AND C. DUPONT
a minimum, evidence of some political commitment to climate action and to CPI, as 
well as recognition of functional overlaps and compatible policymaker beliefs allowed 
for CPI under both Presidencies. Under Barroso’s bottom-up leadership, opportu-
nities for policy entrepreneurship were key for advancing CPI. Under Juncker’s top- 
down leadership, the inclusion of climate action in an overarching priority provided 
direction. But, over the course of the Juncker Presidency, the depth of political 
commitment to climate action and CPI was variable and the quality of interactions 
in the coordination mechanisms remained questionable, while under the Barroso 
Presidency, with policy entrepreneurs advancing CPI, the incompatibility of beliefs 
among policymakers at times hampered CPI. Therefore, it is unclear if the lack of 
policy entrepreneurial opportunities to advance CPI under the Juncker Presidency 
was offset by climate action being embedded in an overarching policy priority, for 
example. What seems likely, however, is that had climate action not been embedded 
in an overarching policy priority, Juncker’s top-down leadership style would likely 
have not improved institutional capacities for CPI compared to Barroso, and could 
have rather dismantled some climate policy and CPI (Gravey & Jordan, 2019).
6. Conclusion
Our research shows that to understand CPI in the EU in general, it is important to 
investigate institutional capacity in the Commission, as a key EU agenda-setter. In 
particular, while much literature has focussed on horizontal coordination efforts across 
DGs to advance CPI, we suggest that a deeper investigation of the vertical dimension of 
institutional capacity for CPI is also necessary. Our paper contributes to filling this gap by 
focusing on the role of different presidential leadership styles for institutional capacity for 
CPI in the Commission.
While we do not come to a clear finding that one presidential leadership style is 
‘better’ than the other to enhance institutional capacities for CPI, we have been able 
to highlight differences along four key factors that can form the basis for more 
detailed investigation, with new empirical data. At the time of writing in 2021, 
opportunities to gather rich, comparative data on institutional capacities for CPI in 
the Commission have grown. The Commission’s European Green Deal, published 
under President von der Leyen (European Commission, 2019), demonstrates (at least 
on paper) top-level political commitment to CPI and outlines an integrative policy 
program that aims to achieve climate neutrality by 2050. The EU’s declared response 
to the COVID-19 pandemic has shown that this commitment can be maintained, 
even in the face of crisis (Dupont et al., 2020). While much still remains to be seen in 
terms of implementation, our analysis suggests that von der Leyen’s presidential 
leadership style will need to maintain high levels of political commitment, but will 
also need to foster an internal Commission environment that allows for CPI in 
practice, through enhanced institutional capacities for openness and awareness, 
strong and meaningful coordination, and opportunities for knowledgeable policy 
entrepreneurs to pursue potentially innovative integrative proposals. Avenues for 
future research include assessing how the von der Leyen Commission fares, thus 
adding rich empirical data, and elucidating the interaction among factors for CPI.
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